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Abstract
In the 1980s, life insurers sold guaranteed investment contracts (GICs) to pension
plan sponsors, then backed these contracts with portfolios heavily weighted with
higher risk assets such as common stocks and junk bonds. Ultimately this caused
considerable loss, and history has repeated itself in many respects in recent years via
holdings of equities and mortgage-backed securities. We evaluate the risky asset
substitution in the life insurance industry from an historical perspective to determine if
organizational form or other factors might be rationale for managerial decisions to
engage in asset substitution. We find evidence that stock insurer managers are more
likely than their mutual counterparts to engage in this type of risky asset substitution.
Our findings provide rich ground for future research as the subprime mortgage and
credit default swap debacles unfold, as well as public policy implications for
insurance regulators concerned with the fiscal health of the insurance industry.
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Introduction
As a group, life insurers recently have been among the hardest hit industries in the
U.S. in terms of market valuation and financial strength. Touryalai (2009) notes an
average loss in life insurer stock values of nearly 60% between April 2008 and 2009,
compared to a drop of approximately 40% for the Standard and Poor’s 500 index. While
some recovery of valuations has occurred in early-to-mid-2009, ratings downgrades and
the poor stock performances of life insurers have left leading investment analysts and
financial advisors leery of the industry’s future prospects (Mercado, 2009).
One of the great concerns to regulators is the continuing decline of life insurers’
financial strength ratings (FSRs). Thirty-one life insurers experienced downgrades in
their FSRs during 2008, while only eight were assigned upgrades (Touryalai, 2009).
Downgrades in 2009 have been announced for such prominent life insurers as
Hartford Life, ING USA Annuity and Life, Lincoln National, MetLife, Protective
Life, and Prudential Financial, to name a few.
Some of the more troubled life insurers have been forced to bolster their capital
positions by turning to national governments and/or attempting to sell some of their
key business units. For instance, ING Groep N.V. turned to the Dutch government to
absorb 80% of their residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), but their U.S.
subsidiaries still have substantial exposure to both residential and commercial
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) (Mirabella and Edelsberg, 2009).
Lincoln National and Hartford Financial recently have followed an unprecedented
strategy of buying relatively small thrift institutions just so they could access funds
from the U.S. government’s Troubled Asset Relief Program. Potential spillover effects
to the property-casualty industry are apparent in the case of Hartford Financial. After
failed attempts to sell their life insurance operations, Hartford reportedly explored
selling their core property-casualty insurance businesses, which carried higher
financial ratings than the life subsidiaries (Greenwald, 2009a; Greenwald, 2009b).
The woes of the life insurance industry are reminiscent of the 1991 Executive
Life debacle, which stemmed from risky “junk” bond investments, although today’s
industry is suffering because of investments in MBS and equities. It appears that at
least with respect to high-risk investment behavior, history has repeated itself. What
factors might be useful in explaining such risky behavior on the part of firms that are
primarily in the business of reducing the financial consequences of risk for others?
Events in the life insurance industry point to fundamental failures in asset-liability
management by many large firms. In particular, analysts and observers cite frequent
mismatches of long-term bonds, equities, and MBS with the variable annuity liabilities
that often feature relatively high, short-term, guaranteed rates. By the end of 2008 such
prominent life insurers as Allstate Life, Hartford Life, ING USA Annuity Life, John
Hancock Life, and Security Life of Denver were reported to hold commercial MBS rated
A or lower that exceeded total capital and surplus for each firm (Touryalai, 2009).
Financial researchers are just beginning to explore both the impact and causes of
the recent asset-liability management problems among U.S. life insurers. In particular,
real-estate-related holdings, especially residential MBS, have been expanded greatly,
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and potential ratings downgrades have been projected to greatly affect insurer
capitalization in the future (Baranoff and Sager, 2009; Liebenberg, Colquitt, and
Hollans, 2009). These are preliminary results at best, however, and we are unlikely to
more fully understand both the motivations for management to mismatch assets and
liabilities during the recent crisis and the ultimate effects until more data from
subsequent years are available.
In this study we take a different approach from prior researchers by looking back
to a previous era in which managers of some life insurers may have exploited unique
regulatory and market conditions to deliberately mismatch assets and liabilities. We
first provide readers with a review of the literature on asset substitution and explain
how it can pertain to life insurers. We then discuss regulatory and market conditions
in the late 1980s that allowed insurers to actively engage in mismatching assets and
liabilities in an effort to increase equity values. Finally, we empirically explore
specific factors that can lead to such practices.

Executive Life and GICs
Leading up to the 1991 Executive Life insolvency, along with the insolvency of
other insurers that had overextended their portfolios in risky assets, were historic
changes in U.S. financial markets, including uncharacteristically high interest rates,
heightened competition among financial institutions, development of new financial
products, and expanded demand in the pension marketplace. Much of the increased
demand from pension funds came from the rapid growth of 401(k) retirement plans, a
type of defined contribution pension plan that was introduced into the U.S. tax code in
1978.
Between 1983 and 1988, the number of workers covered by 401(k) plans nearly
quadrupled, bringing new money into the pension marketplace that needed to be invested.
Life insurers, as traditional providers of investment products for the pension industry,
were the natural suppliers for this market. Large insurers, with broad in-house expertise
and reputations for financial stability, began to design new financial products for
retirement plan sponsors. Among the more popular products was the guaranteed
investment contract (GIC), which is similar to a certificate of deposit in that it has a fixed
maturity and the issuer is obligated to repay principal and interest in a lump sum at
maturity.
During the 1980s the value of GICs outstanding increased from less than $5
billion to over $150 billion, with more than 60% of all 401(k) retirement plan
participants investing in these instruments by the end of the decade (Morris, 1990).
GICs were attractive to pension fund managers because the suppliers of GICs tended
to be the larger, more highly rated life insurers. These firm characteristics imparted an
aura of safety to GICs, even though they were priced to provide yields comparable to
intermediate-term government and corporate bonds (Walker, 1992).
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The sale of GICs created a substantial infusion of cash to large life insurers, and
managers faced the challenge of investing to earn returns in excess of the promised
yields. One possibility was to buy higher risk assets such as common stocks and
below-investment-grade bonds, popularly known as junk bonds. Short-term profits
from such a strategy proved too lucrative for some insurance managers to ignore. By
mid-1987, life insurers had become the largest institutional buyers of junk bonds,
which accounted for 7.5% of admitted assets (Smyth, 1987; A. M. Best, 1992). Not all
GIC suppliers invested in higher risk assets, however. For example, New York Life
and Guardian Life, both issuers of GICs, eventually publicized their negligible
holdings of junk bonds (Lublin, 1990).
In this study, we argue that the sale of GICs and subsequent investment of
proceeds in common stocks and junk bonds systematically increased the risk profiles
of some insurers’ asset portfolios during the 1980s. The substitution of higher-risk
assets for lower-risk ones is what we are referring to as asset substitution, and is first
described in Jensen and Meckling (1976). While this strategy should not be
dynamically consistent with limited disclosure of insurers’ asset portfolio values, new
incentives to invest in 401(k) plans, and misinformation about junk bond risks,
allowed managers to pursue this strategy.
Our evidence suggests that, in such an environment, managers of stock insurers
generally found asset substitution strategies to be more appealing than did managers of
stock insurers. For a sample of 95 life and health insurers in 1989, our multivariate
model indicates that managers of stock insurers maintained an incremental common
stock and junk bond position amounting to 4.3% of total assets held. This difference
translates to an economically significant amount exceeding $105 million worth of
common stocks and junk bonds per stock insurer. Because GIC returns were
approximately equal across issuers,5 our results suggest that managers of stock insurers
were able to engage in asset substitution that potentially transferred wealth from fixed to
residual claimants. Nine years later, when the conditions conducive to asset substitution
should have dissipated, we find no similar evidence of asset substitution.
Motivated by conflicting research on whether mutual-owned stock (MOS) firms
act more like mutual or stock firms, we find some evidence that managers of MOS
insurers issuing GICs during the late 1980s behaved similarly to mutual managers
during the late 1980s, or maybe even a bit more conservatively.
Our study is organized as follows. First, we discuss the implications of
organizational forms in the insurance industry for managers’ investing policies. We
then explore why managers of insurers were able to substitute assets during the 1980s.
In the next section, we present our primary hypothesis and discuss other factors that
must be considered in conducting our empirical tests. We then describe the research
design, followed by our empirical results. In the final section, we summarize our main
findings and offer suggestions for future study.

5. See, e.g., surveys in Pensions and Investments Age of GIC rates offered by leading suppliers
(Williams, 1989a, 1989b).
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Organizational Form and Asset Substitution
by Insurers
Two organizational firms—the mutual firm and the stock company—dominate in
the life insurance industry. As explained by Esty (1997) and Lee, Mayers, and Smith
(1997), fixed and residual claims are bundled in a mutual organization, while they are
separable in a stock firm. Residual claimants of an insurer essentially hold a call
option. One implication of options pricing theory is that any managerial action that
increases the volatility of firm value will increase the value of this call option while
decreasing the value of fixed claims. Esty (1997) states that either investing in assets
with volatile cash flows or mismatching the duration of assets and liabilities can
accomplish this goal. In addition to Esty (1997), Staking and Babbel (1995) also
discuss the effect of mismatched duration (and leverage) on the value of the investors’
call option with respect to property/casualty insurers. Consequently, residual
claimants in stock firms can increase their wealth by providing managers with
incentives to use the previously described techniques to increase the volatility of firm
value. Fixed claimants therefore should expect higher contracting and monitoring
costs and should extract a risk premium, such as a higher yield on GICs purchased.
Because residual and fixed claims are bundled in mutuals, the claimants cannot
expect a net gain when asset volatility is increased, and they are unlikely to give
managers incentives to do so. This conclusion represents a natural extension of the
managerial discretion hypothesis (Mayers and Smith, 1981), which states that mutual
insurers will be limited to operations requiring relatively less managerial discretion
because the residual claimants of mutuals also are fixed claimants, and they have no
incentives to encourage higher risk activities. Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) find that
managers of mutual insurers are less prone to increase portfolio risk around enactments
of state guaranty fund laws, which lends support to this extension of theory.
Our study differs from Lee, Mayers, and Smith in that we examine risk shifting in
a naturally evolving, competitive marketplace. We contribute to the literature by
explaining how certain market conditions and opaque accounting procedures can
combine to create an environment in which managers are able to substitute assets. We
then empirically test for asset substitution among insurers in such an environment and
at a later time when the favorable conditions should have dissipated.
We follow the rationale of Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997, p. 13) in assuming that
common stocks generally are riskier than the other major categories of assets held by
insurers. Another identifiable, higher risk category is that of junk bond holdings,
which exhibit relatively high credit and liquidity risks and are typically callable,
thereby adding interest rate risk to insurer portfolios. During the 1980s, the average
maturity of GICs issued by insurers often was much shorter than that of the junk bond
portfolio underlying them (Richmond, 1992). Consequently, the addition of junk
bonds to insurer asset portfolios generally increased both the risks of cash flow
volatility and the interest rate risk caused by asset/liability mismatching.
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Asset substitution should not be dynamically consistent in competitive markets
because fixed claimants will quickly realize that part of the value of their claim is
being transferred to residual claimants and they will demand a risk premium and/or
costly contractual protection. We argue that the confluence of several unique factors
in the financial markets of the 1980s created opportunities both for asset substitution
by managers and a natural experiment for researchers to test systematic relations
between insurers’ organizational structure and the investment decisions of managers.

Why Asset Substitutions Strategies Could
Persist in the 1980s
We posit that during the 1980s the estimates of wealth transfers by purchasers of
products from life insurers were likely to be biased downward, thereby allowing
managers to substitute assets for a prolonged period without suffering adverse effects
on prices or contractual covenants. We subsequently discuss three likely factors for
this phenomenon.

Industry Disclosure Environment
Although insurers filed asset portfolio data with state regulators and the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) during the 1980s, these disclosures
were inadequate for investors to accurately assess insurer portfolio risk. For example,
bonds listed in the required annual statements were shown at amortized rather than
market values. While the diligent fixed claimant could convert the book value of
bonds to market values for actively traded securities, the secondary markets for most
bonds held by insurers often were thinly traded, making market valuation problematic.
GIC documents provided little additional disclosure because of a no-action letter from
the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1977 that effectively extended Section
3(a)8 of the Securities Act of 1933 to GICs sold to tax-qualified pension and profitsharing plans. This decision effectively exempted GICs from the registration and
delivery requirements typical for investment products such as mutual funds.
Instead of direct valuation of insurers’ underlying investment portfolios, fixed
claimants could use financial strength ratings published by private agencies. Belth
(1982, 1990) documents an upward drift in ratings by the dominant rating agency,
A.M. Best Company, during the 1980s; however, in 1987, the year in which junk
bond holdings of life insurers peaked, Best gave nearly all GIC issuers its top ratings.
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To differentiate themselves from weaker competitors, some insurers turned to more
exclusive agencies, such as Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s, but these ratings also
tended to be inflated and were slow to adjust to financial deterioration.6

New Demand for Investment-Oriented Products
The Tax Reform Act of 1981 created new incentives to invest in 401(k) and other
defined contribution plans (Ippolito, 1992).7 The 401(k) plan often became the vehicle
of choice in the 1980s. Individual participants could select investments within these
plans, and GICs frequently proved to be the favored, fixed-income product. Generally
accepted accounting practices during the 1980s allowed plan sponsors to report GIC
holdings at book rather than market values, so they did not have to explain market
fluctuations to their presumably risk-averse participants.8
While the demand for GICs increased in the 1980s, sponsors of defined
contribution plans were subject to much lower fiduciary standards under various
federal laws, including the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The most
burdensome requirement was that sponsors deliver investment options commensurate
with their stated risk-return qualities. Monitoring responsibilities were substantially
shifted to the individual participants, who were likely to view themselves as
customers rather than investors and not be as vigilant as large sponsors of defined
benefit pensions once had been.

Misinformation About Junk Bond Risks
Although the junk bond market had operated since the late 1970s, sufficient data to
allow empirical measurement of the risk-return attributes of these securities did not
accumulate until the mid-1980s. Using data for 1977 through 1986, Blume and Keim
(1987) found that junk bonds offered significantly higher monthly returns and lower
variation than did investment-grade corporate and Treasury bonds. Researchers later
noted that the comparative measures probably were biased because of improper default
risk assessment, and better estimates of default rates eventually emerged (Altman, 1989;
6. For example, Executive Life of California maintained junk bond holdings approaching 40%
of admitted assets in 1990 and it ranked 13th among life insurers in GIC sales. The insurer was rated
A+ by Best, AAA by S&P, and A1 by Moody’s. One year later, Executive Life was declared
insolvent. See DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Gilson (1994) for details of the Executive Life failure.
7. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994) question whether the growth of 401(k) plans represents net
new savings or merely substitutes for traditional, defined benefit pension plans. Eisner (1996)
examines U.S. Census Bureau data and concludes that individuals have not substituted 401(k) wealth
for wealth previously held in defined benefit and other pension plans. Papke (1999) provides
evidence that employers sometimes introduce 401(k) plans as substitutes for defined benefit plans,
but generally finds this not to be the case.
8. In August 1992, the Financial Accounting Standards Board ruled, in FAS 110, that defined
benefit plans would no longer be allowed to report GIC holdings at book values. Concern voiced in the
financial press by GIC managers, insurers, and the pension industry about this ruling indicates the
perceived worth of book value reporting (see, e.g., Geisel, 1991; Greenwald, 1991; and Williams, 1990).
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Altman, 1992; Asquith, Mullins, and Wolff, 1989). Temporary mispricing of junk bonds
during the first half of the 1980s should have increased incentives for managers already
prone toward asset substitution to more actively pursue this policy.

Hypothesis and Test Variables
Main Hypothesis
Our primary research hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is:
Of the life insurers that issued GICs, managers of stock companies
were more likely than managers of mutual or mutual-owned stock
firms to accumulate higher risk investments, consistent with asset
substitution strategies.
We condition our hypothesis on participation in GIC markets because, for the
reasons discussed earlier, we believe these insurers had particular opportunities to
profit via asset substitution during the 1980s.
Because the managerial discretion hypothesis indicates that mutual managers will
tend to pursue actuarially predictable activities, one must question why mutual insurers
offered GIC products at all. We suspect that, as with managers of stock insurers, mutual
managers initially recognized opportunities to capitalize on their reputations and
expertise in the pension marketplace to offer profitable new GIC products. As
competition flourished in the 1980s, the spreads between GIC rates and underlying asset
yields probably narrowed, yet many mutuals continued to offer GICs at competitive
rates, most likely to retain their shares of the pension investment market.

Dependent Variable
Because market valuation of insurer asset portfolio risk is not publicly available,
we use annual statement values of different asset categories, as percentages of total
invested assets, to measure risk in a manner similar to Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997).
While their analysis is limited to relative holdings of common stocks, our proxy for
asset portfolio risk is the ratio of common stocks plus below-investment-grade bonds
to the total value of the insurer’s investment portfolio.9

9. We do not adjust our measure of portfolio risk for derivatives or off-balance-sheet
instruments (for discussion of these assets see, e.g., Cummins, Phillips, and Smith, 1997). These data
were not publicly available from the NAIC until 2001. Even if the data were available, assessing the
actual value by which to reduce the underlying asset values is problematic. For instance, the value of
a call option generally is far from a dollar-for-dollar hedge against market changes in the underlying
stock unless the call is in-the-money and near expiration.
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Organizational Form Variables
We investigate differences between stock and mutual insurers. We expect that
stock insurers will have higher risk asset portfolios than mutual insurers in the late
1980s because managers of stock insurers have both greater discretion over
investment policy and greater incentives to substitute assets, and because of the
previously mentioned specific conditions characteristic to the 1980s. We also attempt
to add to the discussion about whether mutual-owned stock (MOS) insurers act more
like mutual or stock firms. MOS insurers are stock insurers for which mutual insurers
hold most of the outstanding equity. Mayers and Smith (1994) argue that MOS and
mutual insurers have similar operating characteristics, and so should exhibit similar
behavior. However, Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997) find that managers of MOS
insurers act more like stock insurers by actively engaging in asset substitution in
response to enactment of state guaranty funds.

Interaction Variable
GIC Liabilities
We include this variable, which reflects the extent to which the insurer is issuing
GIC products, so that we can interact it with our organizational form variables.
Cummins, Phillips, and Tennyson (2001) interact dummy and non-dummy variables
in their regression models, and this method is described in more detail in Wooldridge
(2003, pp. 233-234). For example, in a regression with a stock dummy and a stock
dummy*GIC liabilities interaction term, the coefficient on the stock dummy measures
the difference in intercepts between stock and mutual firms, while the coefficient on
the interaction term indicates the difference in the slopes—that is, in the rate of
change in asset portfolio risk taken on as GIC volume increases. Specifically, the
significance of the interaction term indicates whether changes in GIC volume affect
asset portfolio risk differently for stock and mutual insurers. For example, assume that
the coefficient on the stock dummy is significantly positive. The interaction term
provides a deeper understanding as follows.
A significantly negative coefficient on the interaction term implies that asset
portfolio risk is higher for stock firms at lower levels of GIC volume, but the slope is
greater for mutual firms. So at some higher GIC volume, asset portfolio risk for
mutual insurers becomes higher than for stock insurers. If the coefficient on the
interaction term is not significant, the slopes are the same. If the coefficient on the
interaction term is significantly positive, the interpretation is that asset portfolio risk is
higher for stock insurers than for mutual insurers at all levels of GIC volume, and that
the gap increases as GIC volume increases.
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Control Variables
We control for a variety of factors that should influence managers’ investment
decisions. Our rationales and proxies for these variables follow.
Firm Size
Cummins, Phillips, and Smith (1997) state that economies of scale in information
and transaction costs are likely in the market for risky investments. This should include
stock investments and, especially, the more thinly traded junk bonds. We therefore
anticipate a positive association between size and higher risk investment holdings. Our
proxy for firm size is the natural logarithm of the insurer’s admitted assets.
Leverage
Managers’ incentives to engage in asset substitution can increase with the
proportion of fixed claims in the firm’s capital structure (Gavish and Kalay, 1983;
Green and Talmor, 1986). On the other hand, Cummins and Sommer (1996) suggest
that a negative relation can be expected because insurers with greater capital are more
likely to accept portfolio risk as they target their preferred solvency levels. Given the
rationale and supporting empirical evidence of Cummins and Sommer, we anticipate a
negative relation between leverage and asset portfolio risk. Our leverage proxy is the
ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Because market values for insurer liabilities are
not directly observable, we use book values to ensure adequate sample size and for
comparability across stock and mutual forms.
One can argue that managers may simultaneously make decisions about both the
amount of GICs or similar liabilities and the amount of investment risk they will
accept with the assets generated by these new issues. To address such a potential
problem, Greene (2003) and Kennedy (2003) suggest the use of a lagged dependent
variable. We consequently implement a one-period lag for our leverage variable.
Observable Risk
Campbell and Kracaw (1990) demonstrate that observable financial risk is likely
to be positively related to the unobservable risk of asset substitution by managers. In
essence, managers of firms with a high level of observable financial risk have greater
incentives to transfer wealth from fixed claimants to residual claimants, and they can
do so via asset substitution.
Our ex ante proxy for observable risk is a relative measure of the Insurance
Regulatory Information System (IRIS) ratios falling outside guideline ranges set by
the NAIC as of the end of the previous year. We expect a positive relation with asset
portfolio risk. The IRIS ratios are used by insurance regulators as an initial screening
device to classify insurers in terms of potential insolvency. Klein and Barth (1995)
and Grace, Harrington, and Klein (1998b) note that researchers have raised various
criticisms regarding the effectiveness of IRIS, but the latter researchers find that the
proposed alternative systems developed by critics are not clearly more effective than
IRIS. The NAIC now uses the IRIS ratios to classify insurers in terms of solvency risk
© 2009 National Association of Insurance Commissioners
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before applying a more dynamic system known as Financial Analysis Solvency
Tracking (FAST) to improve risk classification. The FAST system is not available to
the public, however. Grace, Harrington, and Klein (1998a) show that IRIS ratios
remain effective as an initial screening device for predicting insolvency.
Reinsurance Ceded
Campbell and Kracaw (1990) posit that when managers with residual claims
engage in costly hedging of observable risk, they signal their intentions to not increase
unobservable risk through asset substitution. For insurers, the most visible form of
risk hedging is through reinsurance cessions. We therefore predict a negative relation
between net reinsurance ceded, as quantified by Mayers and Smith (1990), and asset
portfolio risk for firms with equity claims outstanding.
Regulatory Environment
A commonly expressed goal of state regulators is to protect fixed claimants,
especially policyholders, by monitoring the solvency of insurers licensed to do
business in their states. While regulators have their own agendas, they also have
incentives to monitor insurer solvency because of the political and economic costs of
failures during their terms in office. We expect insurers subject to relatively strict
regulation to be less prone to substitute assets. Following previous researchers (e.g.,
Boose, 1990; Wells, Cox, and Gaver, 1995; and Krishnaswami and Pottier, 2001), we
use a binary variable for New York regulation as our proxy for stringent regulatory
oversight.10 The New York insurance department is known for both rigorous
regulation and enforcement of extraterritorial rules.11
Separate Accounts
Regulators require separate investment accounts to be maintained for certain lines
of insurance, such as variable life or variable annuities. Assets backing these
obligations are included in a separate statement and are marked to market. Because
separate accounts facilitate monitoring by fixed claimants, we expect the ratio of
separate account assets to total assets to be inversely related to holdings of higher risk
investments.
10. Although researchers commonly apply New York regulation as a control variable
potentially affecting various insurer activities, Pottier and Sommer (1998) suggest that insurer
licensing in New York could be a function of broadly defined lines of business. For our sample,
potential endogeneity of the regulatory variable simply is not a factor, however. Running our model
with and without the regulation variable generates virtually no differences in the coefficients of the
other independent variables or goodness of fit. We choose to report the results for this variable
because it is so commonly tested, however.
11. The rigor of New York regulators is demonstrated by the full recovery of promised benefits
to policyholders of Executive Life of New York in 1993 after the parent company, First Executive,
failed. In contrast, policyholders of Executive Life of California still were awaiting settlement of
claims in 1995. In retrospect, the former insurance commissioner of California characterized the New
York department's efforts as “very aggressive” compared to his own department's “lax” approach to
Executive Life’s financial problems (Geisel, 1992).
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Affiliation
Managers of insurers that are affiliated with insurer groups generally have greater
freedom to accept portfolio risk because it ostensibly can be reduced via
diversification by the holding company. If so, we can expect a positive relation
between group affiliation and asset portfolio risk. We apply a binary variable based
upon whether the insurer is listed as a member of a group by the NAIC.

Research Design
Data
Our primary data source is the NAIC InfoPro database for life and health
insurers. We selected 1989 as our base year because the junk bond market began a
rapid decline shortly thereafter. We also analyzed data for 1998, choosing that year
because it is distant enough that conditions conducive to asset substitution in the
1980s should have disappeared because of regulatory changes and the natural
absorption of information by the markets. We also had hard copies of annual
statements for spot-checking purposes.12
We gathered data on GIC and non-GIC issuers with the goal of using both in a
Heckman two-stage procedure as described later. We started with the NAIC database,
which contains the universe of life and health insurers licensed in the U.S. The 1989
NAIC database had 1,938 life and health insurers and among these, 125 reported
positive guaranteed interest contract liabilities. Guaranteed interest contracts include
GICs purchased by pension plan sponsors and some fixed-rate, single-premium
deferred annuities purchased by individual investors. Following Walker (1992), we
use this data item as our screen for identifying GIC issuers.
GICs normally are written in denominations of $500,000 or more, and contracts
seldom expire simultaneously on the financial statement date. We therefore omit 13
insurers with GIC liabilities of less than $250,000 from our 1989 data. This group
includes 12 stock insurers with median assets of less than $12 million and one mutual
insurer. We also drop 12 foreign-owned insurers and subsidiaries because of unique
organizational or accounting structures that could cause double counting. We then
eliminate three insurers that exclusively write reinsurance for other life insurers, and
two insurers with inadequate data. Our final sample includes 95 GIC issuers, and all
have assets of $100 million or greater. For non-GIC issuers in the NAIC data, we use
relevant screens identical to those applied to the GIC sample and eliminate firms with
total assets less than $100 million, resulting in a final sample of 416 non-issuers.

12. The NAIC database format changes from year to year, reflecting changes in the reporting
forms required of insurers so that rigorous checks against hard copies of insurers’ annual statements
are necessary.
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Based on Best’s Insurance Reports 1990 Life-Health edition, our sample of 95
GIC issuers includes 31 mutual firms, 53 stock companies, and 11 MOS firms. The
mutual parents controlled at least 95% of the stock of the MOS insurers. Our final
sample of 416 non-issuers encompasses 51 mutual, 315 stock, and 50 MOS firms. We
use the same method for the 1998 data, ultimately resulting in 78 GIC issuers and 432
nonissuers.

Regression Specification
We initially apply the following regression model to our sample of 95 life
insurers with GICs outstanding in 1989:
APRISK = γ0 + γ1STKDUM + γ2MOSDUM + γ3GICLIAB + γ4STKDUM *
GICLIAB + γ5MOSDUM * GICLIAB + γ6LNSIZE + γ7LNSIZE +
γ8LAGLEVER + γ9OBRISK + γ10REINS + γ11REG_NY +
γ12SEPACCT + γ13AFFIL + ε

(1)

where:
APRISK

=

STKDUM
MOSDUM
GICLIAB

=
=
=

LNSIZE
LAGLEVER
OBRISK

=
=
=

REINS

=

REG_NY
SEPACCT
AFFIL

=
=
=

asset portfolio risk measure (ratio of common stocks plus
below-investment-grade bonds to total portfolio assets)
stock organizational form (stock=1, mutual=0)
mutual-owned stock organization form (yes=1, no=0)
guaranteed investment contract liabilities divided by total
assets (in percent)
natural logarithm of insurer's admitted assets
ratio of total liabilities to total assets lagged one period
observable risk, represented by the ratio of the number of
Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS) ratios
outside the NAIC-specified range to total IRIS ratios (12)
ratio of reinsurance ceded to the sum of direct premiums
written plus reinsurance assumed
licensed in state of New York (yes=1, no=0)
ratio of separate account assets to total assets
insurer is affiliated with other insurers through a holding
company (yes=1, no=0)
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In our regression specification, we omit mutual insurers, meaning that the
coefficients on the STKDUM and MOSDUM results are relative to mutual insurers.
We expect a significantly positive coefficient for the STKDUM results. A
significantly positive coefficient for MOSDUM would indicate that MOS insurers
behave more like stock firms in agreement with Lee, Mayers, and Smith (1997). An
insignificant coefficient for MOSDUM would provide evidence that MOS insurers
behave more like mutual firms in agreement with Mayers and Smith (1994).
Selection bias could be an issue in using only the insurers with outstanding GICs.
We investigate the selection bias issue by applying Heckman’s (1979) two-stage
regression method.13 This method uses all insurers, both GIC and non-GIC issuers, in
the first stage and generates a factor that is used in the second stage to correct for
selection bias. If the correction factor (rho) is significant in the second stage, we will
use the Heckman results. An insignificant rho in the second stages would indicate that
selection bias is not a problem, in which case we will use OLS with only the GIC
issuers.

Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our sample of life insurers. The median
tests indicate a significant relation between GIC issuance and holdings of higher risk
assets only for mutual insurers.

13. We use the Heckman procedure because managers first select into or out of the cohort of
insurers that issue GICs. Once this decision is made, managers must make decisions in a different
dimension—i.e. the level of asset portfolio risk to accept. Much has been written about handling
selection bias. The Heckman procedure has been criticized by some observers, especially when
applied to small samples (Kennedy, 2003). We follow the Heckman approach because our samples
are relatively large, and Greene (2003) posits that this method normally is applied when selection
bias is possible.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables for 511 Large Life Insurers in 1989
Mutual
Insurers
Variable a
APRISK
GIC Issuers
Non-issuers
Median Test: GIC
Issuers vs. Non-issuers c
LAGLEVER
GIC Issuers
Non-issuers
Median Test: GIC
Issuers vs. Non-issuers
LNSIZE
GIC Issuers
Non-issuers
Median Test: GIC
Issuers vs. Non-issuers
OBRISK
GIC Issuers
Non-issuers
Median Test: GIC
Issuers vs. Nonissuers
SEPACCT
GIC Issuers
Nonissuers
Median Test: GIC
Issuers vs. Nonissuers
GICLIAB

Stock
Insurers

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Median Test:
Mutuals vs. Stocks b

6.56
6.41

5.68
3.89

10.60
10.98

6.29
6.13

Not Sig.
Sig.

Not Sig.

Sig.

95.34
88.432

96.14
91.00

91.11
83.02

22.27
19.52

21.05
19.95

0.00
0.00

1.36
1.72

5.72
0.00

5.23
3.03

14.15

1.00
1.00

Sig.
Sig.

0.35
0.00

Sig.
Not Sig.

Sig.

Sig.
15.74

Sig.
Not Sig.

Not Sig.

Not Sig.

8.59
5.31

21.03
19.75
Sig.

Sig.

0.77
0.94

Sig.
Sig.

Sig.

Sig.

22.32
19.87

93.08
87.78

10.70

a

2.46

Sig.

APRISK = stock and below-investment-grade bond holdings divided by total assets (in percent); LNSIZE
= natural logarithm of the insurer’s admitted assets; LAGLEVER = total liabilities (total assets − surplus)
divided by total assets (in percent) for 1988; OBRISK = number of Insurance Regulatory Information
System (IRIS) ratios outside the ranges deemed satisfactory by the NAIC; SEPACCT = separate account
assets divided by total assets (in percent); and GICLIAB = guaranteed investment contract liabilities
divided by total assets (in percent).
b
Sig. indicates median test for differences between mutual and stock insurers is significant at the 5% level.
Not Sig. indicates no significant differences between mutual and stock insurers.
c
Sig. indicates median test for differences between GIC issuers and non-issuers is significant at the 5%
level. Not Sig. indicates no significant differences between GIC issuers and non-issuers.
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Both stock and mutual GIC issuers are larger and more highly leveraged than are
the non-issuers. This suggests that the larger insurers with established reputations are
more likely to enter the GIC markets. Despite significantly different leverage between
GIC issuers and nonissuers, our observable risk proxy is not significantly different for
the two samples. GIC issuers did have larger separate account liabilities, although the
difference in magnitude was relatively small for stock insurers.
While stock GIC issuers generally held greater proportions of higher risk assets
than their mutual counterparts, the difference was not significant. The results in Table
1 also reveal that the mutual GIC issuers were larger than stock GIC issuers, and they
had issued both more fixed claims and separate account contracts. Our multivariate
results, discussed later, address the mitigating impact of these factors with respect to
organizational form.
Table 2 shows the correlation analysis of the proxies for the independent
variables in our model. The only correlation above 0.5 is between leverage and size
(0.54). We also compute the variance inflation factors (VIFs) developed by Belsley,
Kuh, and Welsch (1980), and find that all fall below 2.0, except for size, with VIF =
2.48. Collinearity is likely not a problem if all VIFs are below 10.

© 2009 National Association of Insurance Commissioners

Risky Asset Substitution: An Historical Example

© 2009 National Association of Insurance Commissioners

83

84

Journal of Insurance Regulation

Regression Results
When we implement the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure, we find that the
correction factor (rho) is not significant (p-value: 0.79) in the second stage, indicating
that selection bias is not a problem. Consequently, we report only OLS regressions
using only the GIC issuers. In Table 3 we compare results for our samples of GIC
issuers in 1989 and 1998.
Table 3
Regression Results for Large Life and Health Insurers with
Guaranteed Investment Contracts Outstanding
Dependent Variable = APRISK

Expected
Sign (1989)
Coeff.
Intercept

Dependent Variable = APRISK
1989 (n=95)
Coeff.

p-value

Coeff.

n/a

23.99

+

6.31

MOSDUM

+/insig

-6.49

GICLIAB

+

0.14

STKDUM*GICLIAB

+

0.14

0.03**

-0.30

0.16

MOSDUM*GICLIAB

–

0.18

0.76

-0.15

0.62

LNSIZE

+

1.44

0.09*

1.03

0.08*

LAGLEVER

–

-0.46

0.01**

-0.52

OBRISK

+

2.19

<0.01***

-0.41

0.61

REINS

–

3.40

0.33

-0.01

0.80

REG_NY

–

0.46

0.85

-1.22

0.48

SEPACCT

–

-0.24

0.03**

-0.16

<0.01***

AFFIL

+

0.68

F-statistic

0.02**

29.50

p-value

STKDUM

Adj. R-squared

0.20

1998 (n=78)
0.04**

0.50

0.82

0.11

-3.97

0.16

0.12

0.28

0.16

0.84

0.17

4.19

<0.01***

0.38

0.18
<0.01***

0.01**

STKDUM = 1 if insurer is a stock company and 0 otherwise; MOSDUM = 1 if insurer is a stock company
owned by a mutual insurer and 0 otherwise; GICLIAB = guaranteed investment contract liabilities divided by
total assets (in percent).; LNSIZE = natural log of admitted assets; LAGLEVER = total liabilities (total assets –
surplus) divided by total assets (in percent) for the period t-1; OBRISK = the number of Insurance Regulatory
Information System (IRIS) ratios outside the ranges deemed satisfactory by the NAIC; REINS = reinsurance
ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums written plus reinsurance assumed; REG_NY = 1 if insurer is
licensed in New York and 0 otherwise; SEPACCT = separate account assets divided by total assets (in percent);
and AFFIL = 1 if insurer has a group affiliation and 0 otherwise.
* p-value < 0.10
** p-value < 0.05
*** p-value < 0.01
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Results for GIC Issuers – Organizational Form Variables
The 1989 results show that the stock organizational form is positively and
significantly related to asset portfolio risk at the 5% level, which supports our primary
hypothesis. On average, stock insurers issuing GICs maintained an incremental
position in common stocks and junk bonds amounting to 4.3% of total assets held.
This translates to an economically significant difference of over $105 million worth of
higher risk assets per stock insurer. The STKDUM*GICLIAB interaction term is
positive and significant at the 5% level. Along with the STKDUM results, this
indicates that stock insurers were taking on more asset portfolio risk than mutual
insurers at all levels of GIC volume, and that the gap increases as GIC volume
increases. Overall, these results provide evidence that during the 1980s and among the
insurers that issued GICs, stock companies were more prone to asset substitution—
that is, accumulating higher risk investments—than were mutual insurers.
The 1989 MOS coefficient is negative but not significant. The MOSDUM *
GICLIAB interaction term is not significant, indicating there is no significant difference
between mutual and MOS insurers in the slopes—that is, in the rate of increase in asset
portfolio risk taken on as GIC volume increases. Our results support the theory of
Mayers and Smith (1994) that MOS insurers should behave more like mutual insurers
than stock insurers in contrast to the empirical findings of Lee, Mayers, and Smith
(1997). Even though MOS coefficient results are not significant, it is close to being
negatively significant at the 10% level. Another interpretation of these results is weak
evidence that MOS insurers are even more conservative than mutual insurers when it
comes to higher risk investments. As discussed in Mayers and Smith (1994), fixed
claimants, such as policyholders and investors, have virtually no power to remove
managers of MOS insurers because they do not have the right to engage in proxy fights
for control of the mutual firm that appoints managers. To control the high costs of this
fixed claimant-management conflict, managers of MOS firms are likely to be given even
less managerial discretion over activity choices than are mutual managers, which could
explain why the coefficient on the MOS variable is negative and close to being
significant. We also state a note of caution about the MOS results because there are only
11 MOS insurers in our sample.
By 1998, the unique conditions causing informational asymmetries should have
dissipated as regulations changed (see, e.g., footnote 6), information about GICs and
junk bonds was fully disseminated, and the demand for new pension products
stabilized. The incentives for stock managers to issue GICs and accept relatively
greater portfolio risk should have correspondingly evaporated. Our regression using
the 1998 data indicates that the stock form variable is insignificant, so stock managers
were not actively substituting assets by that time. The MOS coefficient remains
negative and still insignificant, as in the 1989 results.
In another regression, not reported in the tables, we combine the 1989 and 1998
data for GIC issuers and control for structural change across time as described in
Wooldridge (2003, p.431). In this test, we start with the regression model in equation
(1), omit the interaction terms, and add a binary variable for the year 1998, plus we
interact this variable with all the other variables. The coefficients for the 1998 dummy
and for interaction for 1998 dummy and stock organizational form variables are both
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negative and significant at the 10% level. This provides some evidence that after
controlling for unobserved structural change (that is, change not reflected by the
variables in the regression) between 1989 and 1998, stock firms issuing GICs in 1998
did not take on as much asset risk as stock firms issuing GICs in 1989. These findings
supply further support for our contention that stock managers were able to substitute
assets in 1989, but that such a practice is not dynamically viable.
Results for GIC Issuers – Control Variables
In the 1989 results, size is positively related to higher risk investments as expected
and significant at the 10% level, which is consistent with the economies of scale and
transaction costs arguments. The 1989 results indicate a significantly negative relation
between leverage and asset portfolio risk. These findings support the Cummins and
Sommer (1996) hypothesis that managers of firms with higher capital levels are more
likely to hold higher risk portfolios as they target their preferred solvency levels. The
coefficient for observable risk is positive and significant at the 1% level, consistent with
our expectation. The separate accounts factor is significantly negative at the 5% level,
also as expected. This finding provides some support for our argument that fixed
claimants can more effectively monitor separate accounts, thereby limiting managerial
opportunities to engage in asset substitution through investment in higher risk assets.
The coefficients for reinsurance activity, regulation, and group affiliation are not
significant in 1989. The results for the regulatory variable could be at least partially
attributable to the relatively crude proxy available to us.
The results for 1998 are very consistent with those for 1989, as all but one of the
previously significant control variables remain significant. The one exception is the
observable risk coefficient, which indicates that managers of GIC issuers with observably
higher default risk were not prone to take greater investment risk by the late 1990s.

Conclusions
Regulators, consumers, and investors are concerned about asset substitution that
may be detrimental to various stakeholders. Under normal conditions, we would not
expect insurer management to substitute higher risk assets without adverse effects on
contracts and/or prices. Our analysis suggests that in the 1980s, a period notable for
changes in pension and investment markets and lagging regulatory policies, managers
were able to engage in this type of asset substitution. Future research should examine
the subprime mortgage crisis and insurer holdings of those assets in the early part of
the millennium.
We posit that agency theory, in tandem with the managerial discretion hypothesis,
provide a viable explanation of why some managers of GIC issuers shifted risk via
asset substitution while others did not. Our results provide evidence that managers of
stock firms issuing GICs were more likely to accept greater asset portfolio risk during
the unique period of the late 1980s. Nearly a decade later, after regulatory policies
were revised and market conditions stabilized, we find no evidence of asset
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substitution by managers of stock insurers. Direct tests for the effects of changes in
market conditions and regulatory policies remain outside the scope of this study, but
impress us as likely topics for future research.
A debate has centered around whether MOS form is more like the stock or mutual
organizational form (Mayers and Smith, 1994; Lee, Mayers, and Smith, 1997).
Agency theory indicates that the MOS form should at least partially mitigate
managerial incentives to accept risk and, therefore, to substitute assets when market
conditions allow. Our evidence suggests that MOS insurers behave more like mutual
insurers, or perhaps are even marginally more conservative than mutual insurers.
Our analysis and evidence suggests that the positive theory of insurance must be
developed further to explain incentive structures or regulatory regimes that can
prevent insurers from accumulating relatively risky asset portfolios when market
conditions are conducive to asset substitution. This study has focused on insurer asset
portfolio risk. Future studies should expand the investigation to insurer underwriting
portfolio risk.
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